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REMARKS OF
CECILIA MEDINA-QUIROGA*
There are two different themes that I would like to address. The
first of them concerns the problem of human rights and women's
rights. The second deals with the nature of the problems of women's
rights, and in general of all human rights, and the various ways to
address them. I begin with the first theme because I am a lawyer and,
therefore, I can deal with that much more easily. Moreover, I have
not been involved in the women's movement as such. I teach human
rights law, so it is from the perspective of someone who teaches in
that field that I will react to what has been said today.
My first comment would be that today a terrible effort has been
made-perhaps without the speakers realizing it-to try to prove that
women are human beings. If you notice what Rebecca Cook and
Elizabeth Spahn have done, you realize that what we are trying to say
actually is that women are human beings, and because they are
human beings they have rights. This makes sense, because human
rights have been legitimized. Nobody can contend now that human
rights are not legitimate. Therefore, by introducing the idea that
women are human beings and that consequently they have human
rights, we advance a long way into making the struggle of women
legitimate.
Another comment-prompted by what has been said concerning
the inadequacy of general human rights law to solve women's
problems and the need to set forth different rights for women-is
that in principle, from a legal point of view, all women's problems can
be solved by general human rights law. What is at the bottom of
human rights is the principle of autonomy. Therefore, arguing from
the point of view that any adult should be autonomous in its
decisions, we could easily come to argue that reproductive freedom,
for example, is a right that people have-that women have. This is
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true because reproductive freedom is only one aspect of the principle
of autonomy which informs all human rights.
The indivisibility of human rights can be perceived quite clearly
when we look at women's rights and women's problems. When we
use international human rights law, we should keep this in mind and
be aware that we have two possibilities: one is interpretation and the
other is standard setting. If we can use the former, we should do
that. As you know, whenever a lawyer reads a legal provision, the first
thing she says when asked about its meaning is "It depends." Often,
the reader makes the law more than the law makes the reader.
Therefore, if we read the law with women's eyes, we probably will be
able to go a long way into incorporating economic, social, and
cultural rights into civil and political rights, which are fnuch better
protected at the international level. We could also incorporate the
manners in which human rights of women are violated, and sensitize
those who are charged with the application of human rights law.
The other thing would be that whenever we cannot interpret some
things as a means to securing women's rights-when something is
absolutely impossible to be read from a provision-then we have to
go to standard setting and describe a right in such a way that the
problems of women will be addressed. For example, we could look
at rape as a form of torture, which it is. But we could also think that
such an interpretation will be difficult with the way international
supervisory bodies are composed today-mostly of men, and often
with nonprogressive people-then perhaps it is better that we forget
about trying to interpret rape as torture and try to develop a right to
be free from rape.
The legitimacy of human rights also allows us to use them to
change culture. In this sense we have to look at human rights as
instruments that the legal profession has given us that can be used to
pursue a change in culture. Consequently, our best way of combat-
ting culture that is oppressive for certain sectors of society is to say,
"Well, these are my human rights and here no culture can annul
them."
Further, there are various mechanisms to deal with human rights
problems and we should be careful to identify the problem before
deciding on a course of action; we should separate issues and use
mechanisms accordingly. Civil and political rights problems are
different than economic, social, and cultural rights problems; gross,
systematic violations of human rights are not the same as isolated
violations. If we are able to separate all these issues, then we would
not debate whether human rights are useful or not useful to deal with
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women's rights problems, but we would use the appropriate mecha-
nisms for each different situation. For gross, systematic violations, for
example, political action is indispensable. But legal action is also
important to document evidence of an illegal situation so that
political sanctions have sound support. For isolated violations,
perhaps it is very important to have adjudication because a win in one
case can generate immense legitimacy. General human rights law
envisages all these possibilities.
As to the second theme, what I have said about law and legal
mechanisms does not mean that we will not have to use other
channels; we have to use all channels. This leads me to two things.
One is that human rights-and certainly women's rights, because they
are human rights-are not primarily a legal problem. Human rights
are ultimately a legal problem in the sense that law reacts and offers
solutions, as law always does where there are values that we wish to see
implemented in a society. This being so, I have only to agree with the
use of interdisciplinary approaches to the problem of women's rights.
Second, I must emphasize the importance of knowing facts when
deciding how to go about struggling for women's rights. Facts are
stubborn. We have a tendency as lawyers to try to fit facts in a very
round, all-comprehensive institution that we have made. Sometimes
the facts will not fit where we would like them to go. This is not only
the realm of reproductive rights-it applies everywhere. For example,
we must convince women that women are for women and not against
them, so we have to listen to what they say. We have to really look at
the facts and see very clearly what it is that women want and how we
can best give that to them, without sacrificing the rights of others.
And you don't do that without intense research, research that should
begin, as it were, with a clean slate-not with prejudices, not with
what we would like them to be, but really trying to see what the world
is like and then designing the solutions for it. In doing the latter, we
have to be imaginative enough to design new procedures, new
methods, and new approaches.
You see, we have to look at what is the best from the point of view
of strategy and tactics. And mostly we have to look at what women
say, what women need. We should really listen to them and forget
the particularities of our individual disciplines.
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